Entra ID administrators must move to phishing‑resistant authentication before 2027
Enterprise identity teams must replace SMS and voice authentication with phishing‑resistant methods such as passkeys before 1 February 2027, as Microsoft Entra ID retires those legacy factors for workforce tenants.
Enterprise identity teams are facing a deadline that will change how employees sign in to cloud services. Microsoft Entra ID, the company’s cloud‑based identity platform, will stop supporting SMS and voice‑based second‑factor authentication on 1 February 2027 for workforce tenant scenarios. After that date those methods will no longer be available for logging in, so administrators need to replace them with phishing‑resistant alternatives now.
Why SMS and voice are no longer safe
SMS (text‑message) and voice‑call verification are attractive to attackers because the one‑time codes can be intercepted through phishing or SIM‑swap attacks. Those weaknesses have led Microsoft to retire the methods for the Entra ID workforce market and to recommend stronger options.
What Microsoft is asking admins to do
Microsoft is urging Entra ID administrators to migrate users to methods that resist phishing, such as passkeys, QR‑code authentication, FIDO2 security keys and any other Entra‑ID‑supported sign‑in technique. The guidance applies only to the workforce tenant use‑case, it does not affect Azure AD B2C or Entra External ID customer‑identity scenarios.
Tools that help you find vulnerable accounts
Admins who hold the Authentication Policy Administrator, Global Reader or Security Reader roles can run the Entra SMS/Voice Policy Scanner PowerShell script. The script scans the directory and returns a list of accounts that still rely on SMS or voice verification, giving you a clear picture of the migration workload.
How the passkey rollout will look
Passkeys will become the default authentication experience for Entra ID starting in September 2026. When the rollout reaches an organisation, any user who is currently enabled for SMS or voice will automatically be switched to passkey authentication. The next time they complete a multi‑factor prompt they will be asked to register a passkey, after which the legacy method will be disabled for that account.
Options for organisations that still need phone‑based authentication
Some regulated environments may need to retain phone‑based verification for a period of time. Microsoft allows those organisations to configure a customer‑managed telecom provider (CYOT) through the Microsoft Security Store, effectively delegating the phone‑based factor to a third‑party service while the rest of the tenant moves to password‑less methods.
Recent related changes
In August 2026 Microsoft retired SMS as a first‑factor sign‑in option for Entra ID Free tenants because of the same phishing, fraud and account‑compromise risks. New free tenants can no longer enable SMS for sign‑in, which underscores the broader shift away from phone‑based factors.
Guidance and further reading
Detailed guidance on deploying and managing phishing‑resistant, password‑less authentication in Entra ID is available on Microsoft’s documentation page. The guidance covers planning, user onboarding, and ongoing management, and it includes best‑practice recommendations for rolling out passkeys at scale.
A note on third‑party services
Adaptive Security advertises a 14‑day read‑only email‑security scan for Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace. The service is mentioned in the source material but is not required for the Entra ID migration; it is provided here only as a factual reference.
Uncertainties you should monitor
- It is not yet clear whether third‑party Entra ID customers will receive separate migration timelines or additional tooling.
- Microsoft has not published a detailed rollout calendar that shows when each tenant will be reached.
- Organisations that have not yet implemented any phishing‑resistant method may need extra time to meet the February 2027 deadline.
Next steps for administrators
- Run the Entra SMS/Voice Policy Scanner to identify accounts still using SMS or voice.
- Review the Microsoft documentation and decide which phishing‑resistant method fits your user base.
- Configure a CYOT provider if you must keep phone‑based verification for any users.
- Communicate the upcoming passkey default to users and prepare onboarding material.
- Monitor the September 2026 rollout and verify that users are prompted to register passkeys at their next MFA.
Terms used in this article
- Entra ID, Microsoft’s cloud identity and access management service, previously known as Azure AD.
- Passkey, A password‑less credential stored on a device that uses public‑key cryptography for authentication.
- FIDO2 security key, A hardware token that implements the FIDO2 standard for password‑less sign‑in.
- SIM‑swap attack, A fraud technique where an attacker convinces a mobile carrier to transfer a phone number to a new SIM, allowing interception of SMS codes.
- CYOT, Customer‑Managed Telecom provider, a third‑party service that can deliver phone‑based authentication on behalf of an organisation.
The migration to phishing‑resistant authentication is a practical step to reduce credential‑theft risk. By acting now, you can avoid a forced cut‑over in 2027 and give your users a smoother, more secure sign‑in experience.