Attackers Pose as IT Support on Microsoft Teams, Abuse AD CS to Steal Company Data
Attackers pretended to be IT support on Microsoft Teams, used Quick Assist to control PCs, abused insecure AD CS configurations to obtain privileged certificates, and exfiltrated data via an external SFTP server.
When employees receive an unexpected help‑desk request on Microsoft Teams, the risk of a breach can be higher than they expect. Recent investigations revealed two intrusions in which attackers pretended to be IT support, used Microsoft’s Quick Assist remote‑control tool, and then abused insecure Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) configurations to issue privileged login certificates. One of the attacks resulted in company data being copied to an external server.
How the attackers gained initial access
The threat actors opened a chat on Microsoft Teams, claimed to be from the internal IT department, and asked users to start a Quick Assist session. Quick Assist allows a remote helper to view and control a Windows PC. By convincing users to grant access, the attackers bypassed perimeter defences and obtained a foothold inside the network. The technique relied entirely on social engineering; no vulnerability in Teams itself was exploited.
Which AD CS weaknesses were leveraged?
AD CS, the service that issues digital certificates for Active Directory, was mis‑configured in both victims. In the first intrusion the attackers found a certificate template known as ESC1. An ESC1‑type template lets the requester specify the account name that the certificate will represent, effectively allowing an attacker to obtain a certificate that authenticates as any privileged account, including a domain controller.
In the second intrusion the attackers used a tool called PetitPotam to coerce a domain controller into authenticating to a machine they controlled. The captured NTLM (Windows NT LAN Manager) hash was then relayed to the AD CS web‑enrollment page, where the attackers requested a certificate for the domain controller itself, a weakness identified as ESC8.

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What happened after the certificates were issued?
Microsoft Defender’s automatic attack‑disruption feature revoked most of the compromised identities. However, one privileged account was excluded from the automatic response and remained active. Using that account, the attacker accessed a file server, launched a copy of the open‑source tool Rclone, and transferred files to an external SFTP (Secure File Transfer Protocol) server. This exfiltration confirmed that data was stolen in at least one of the cases.
Detection and containment
Defender generated ESC8 alerts during the second intrusion. Once the compromised workstation was isolated, no further malicious activity was observed. The alerts helped the incident response team to pinpoint the misuse of certificate templates and to contain the breach.
Practical steps organisations should take
As a Microsoft partner, Stratum recommends the following actions to reduce the risk of similar attacks:
- Validate support requests, Require staff to confirm any unsolicited help‑desk request through a known internal channel before launching Quick Assist.
- Review AD CS templates, Audit certificate templates for over‑privileged enrollment rights; disable the ability to specify arbitrary account names.
- Secure web enrollment, Enforce HTTPS and enable Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) on AD CS web‑enrollment endpoints; disable NTLM where possible.
- Enable certificate auditing, Turn on auditing, revoke any improperly issued certificates, and review active Kerberos tickets because revocation does not invalidate existing tickets.
- Handle excluded accounts manually, Treat any account left out of automatic containment as a manual remediation action.
- Isolate compromised machines promptly, Shut down network access for any workstation showing suspicious activity.
- Leverage Defender for Identity, Activate posture checks for ESC1 and ESC8 exposures to receive early warnings.

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By following these mitigations, organisations can harden their AD CS deployment, limit the impact of social‑engineering attempts, and improve detection of certificate‑abuse scenarios.
Terms used in this article
- AD CS, Active Directory Certificate Services, a Windows role that issues digital certificates for identity and encryption.
- Quick Assist, A built‑in Windows remote‑control utility that lets one user view and control another’s PC.
- NTLM, An older Microsoft authentication protocol; vulnerable to relay attacks when not properly protected.
- ESC1 / ESC8, Microsoft‑identified certificate template weaknesses that allow attackers to request certificates for privileged accounts.
- SFTP, Secure File Transfer Protocol, a network protocol for securely transferring files.
- Rclone, An open‑source command‑line program for copying files to and from cloud storage services.